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Postmodernism and our understanding of science 
Introduction 
In 1987 the Philosopher's Index opened the category 
postmodern(-ism) for the first time. In June 1994 one 
finds 699 entries in this category. This indicates how 
postmodernism exploded onto the philosophical scene. 
Characteristic of postmodernism thus far is the wide 
variety of themes variously applied to different 
disciplines. There is no consensus amongst users of 
postmodern ideas on the definition, scope and relations 
between such ideas (cf. Kirsten 1988:20). Ultimately 
postmodernists would resist any attempt at categorizing 
the definitive characteristics of postmodernism.  
 One could, however, give a short, incomplete 
description of some of the most prominent ideas 
developed by postmodernists over the past decade or so. 
They include Jean-Francois Lyotard's notion of the 
incredulity towards metanarratives (Lyotard 1979:xxiv). 
Metanarratives are attempts to interpret events in such a 
way as to indicate where something (persons, groups, 
nations, societal institutions) come from, what they are 
and where they are going to (cf. Heller and Fehèr 1988:2). 
Thus metanarratives legitimate what people do and justify 
their choice of action. Grand narratives which purport to 
interpret history, so Lyotard contends, have become 
incredulous. 
 Another strong postmodern idea comes from Jacques 
Derrida. His idea of deconstruction signifies a 
postmodern way of reading texts. The concept of a text 
becomes metaphorically extended to include persons, 
events and institutions. Deconstructing texts is a matter of 
"gaining access to the mode in which a system or 
structure, or ensemble, is constructed or constituted, 
historically speaking. Not to destroy it, or demolish it, nor 
to purify it, but in order to accede to its possibilities and 
its meaning; to its construction and its history" (Derrida 
in Mortley 1991:97). Closely associated with this style of 
reading texts is the idea that no authoritative 
interpretation of any text is possible and thus multiple 
readings of a text are possible and justified. 
 A large part of the writings on postmodernism has an 
underlying commitment to foster ideas of heterogeneity, 
fragmentation and difference (cf Boyne 1990:19). 
Wolfgang Welsch (1988:39) identifies this commitment as 
the crux of postmodernism: "indem sie die zutage 
tretende Vielfalt in ihrer Legitimität zu sichern und zu 
entfalten sucht." This implies an attitude of openness to 
anything different and thus the acknowledgement of the 
heterogeneous nature of our world. 
 Despite the flood of philosophical texts on 
postmodernism, relatively few attempts have been made 
to gauge the importance of postmodern ideas for the 
philosophy of science. However, Lyotard's enormously 
influential text The postmodern condition (1979) focussed 
on science and knowledge. He put the term metanarrative 
(grand narrative) into circulation. Lyotard defines the 
term modern to refer to the way in which science tries to 
legitimate its own status by means of philosophical 
discourse which appeal to some kind of grand narrative 
(Lyotard 1984:xxiii). Science needs to legitimate itself as 
being true knowledge by making use of another kind of 
knowledge, which Lyotard calls narrative knowledge 
(Lyotard 1984:29,30). Without this legitimation science 
would presuppose its own validity and proceed on 
prejudice (Lyotard 1984:29). He examines two such grand 
narratives that previously legitimated science in the 
modern world, but now have lost their credibility. One is 
science as the liberator of humanity and the other science 
as a good influence on the character of its participants. He 
describes his now famous definition of the concept 
postmodern, namely an incredulity toward 
metanarratives, as being extremely simplified (Lyotard 
1984:xxiv). 
 Lyotard (1984:18-27) also strongly focuses attention 
on the important role of narratives in human life in that 
narratives provide a certain kind of knowledge that 
cannot be had in any other way. He regards narrative and 
scientific knowledge as two distinct species of discourse 
(Lyotard 1984:26-27), which both fulfill legitimate 
functions and no one's existence is more or less necessary 
than the other's. Lyotard himself sees the function of 
legitimation as the primary role for narrative knowledge, 
and discusses it mostly in that context (1984:27-37). 
 In this article I want to look at philosophers who give 
different appraisals of the merits of postmodern ideas - 
with Lyotardian ones featuring prominently - for 
philosophy of science and our understanding of science. I 
will examine the attempts by Nancey Murphy (1990), 
Pauline-Marie Rosenau (1992), Zuzana Parusnikova 
(1992) and Joseph Rouse (1990, 1991a, 1991b) to develop 
(or reject) a postmodern philosophy of science. In a final 
section I will determine the worth of their views for our 
understanding of science and philosophy of science. 
 Different appraisals of the use of postmodern ideas  
Nancey Murphy 
How varied and controversial definitions of 
postmodernism can be is clear from Nancey Murphy's 
article "Scientific realism and postmodern philosophy," in 
which she uses her own version of postmodernism to 
discredit scientific realism. According to her (Murphy 
1990:292), postmodernism is the result of a revolution 
that took place in philosophy just after the middle of the 
twentieth century. This revolution radically changed 
conceptions of knowledge and language so that 
representatives of modern and postmodern conceptions 
often fail to communicate with one another. The 
originators of these changes are mainly W.V.O. Quine 
(and maybe Thomas Kuhn) in epistemology, and Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and J.L. Austin in philosophy of language. 
 It is clear-cut, says Murphy, that three central 
philosophical theses have dominated modern thought up 
to the middle of the twentieth century. The first is 
epistemological foundationalism, which she (Murphy 
1990:292) defines as the view that knowledge can only be 
justified by "reconstructing it upon indubitable 
'foundational' beliefs." Another dominating modern 
philosophical thesis is the representational or referential 
theory of language. Murphy (1990:292) defines this view 
as one which says that language gets its primary meaning 
"by representing the objects or facts to which it refers." 
The third philosophical thesis of modern thought is 
individualism (atomism) (Murphy 1990:292), which takes 
the individual "to be prior to the community." Murphy 
acknowledges the existence of minority positions in 
modernity, but claims that they have been decisively 
  
shaped by the dominant philosophical theses already 
mentioned. 
 Murphy defines postmodernism thus as that which 
departs decisively from these theses. Postmodern 
epistemology as holism-cum-pragmatism is exemplified 
in Thomas Kuhn's philosophy of science, which Murphy 
(1990:294) describes as a "philosophy-of-science version 
of Quine's view of knowledge". This means that 
knowledge is now viewed holistically as a network or 
fabric, that a community only changes for pragmatic 
reasons (Murphy 1990:294). The postmodern view of 
language is found in the theory of meaning as use, 
developed by Ludwig Wittgenstein and J.L. Austin. This 
view appreciates both the "multiple uses of language", as 
well as the "many complex relations it has to the world" 
(Murphy 1990:294). Both these views - on epistemology 
and language - emphasises the indispensable role of the 
community in postmodern thought against modern 
individualism. As Murphy (1990:294) puts it: "language 
and the search for knowledge are communal 
achievements".  
 Whether Murphy is correct in her characterization of 
postmodern thought is beside the point (cf. Parusnikova's 
rejection (1992:25) of her views). Her view does however 
demonstrate that no clear and generally accepted 
demarcation is possible between modern and postmodern 
thought. It might thus be suggested that one should rather 
develop the idea of a continuum along which typical 
modern philosophy gradually acquires some of the varied 
characteristics of a postmodern nature. This proposal will 
be taken up in the conclusion. 
Pauline Marie Rosenau 
Pauline Marie Rosenau (1992) surveys an extremely wide 
range of postmodern texts written on a diversity of topics 
in order to gauge their relevance for the social sciences. 
According to her, postmodernism poses seemingly endless 
challenges for the social sciences, as it "rejects 
epistemological assumptions, refutes methodological 
conventions, resists knowledge claims, obscures all 
versions of truth, and dismisses policy recommendations" 
(Rosenau 1992:3). These challenges, Rosenau (1992:5) 
says, constitute some of the "greatest intellectual 
challenges to established knowledge of the twentieth 
century." 
 Rosenau points out that postmodernism was widely 
welcomed because it arrived concurrent with, and perhaps 
in response to major changes in the world, such as 
"societal upheaval, cultural transformation, political 
change, deep philosphical debate about core values, and 
disciplinary crises" (Rosenau 1992:9). The origins of 
postmodernism are also diverse. It has overlaps with 
several contemporary intellectual movements, such as 
French structuralism, romanticism, phenomenology, 
nihilism, populism, existentialism, hermeneutics, 
Western Marxism, critical theory and anarchism. She 
indicates that postmodernism shares elements with such 
views, but also differs from all of them. Postmodernism 
has a cut-and-paste character and shows an absence of 
unity. This is because postmodernism allows and 
encourages an infinite number of varying and differing 
combinations of alternatives drawn from a diversity of 
intellectual backgrounds. These combinations 
appropriate, transform and transcend the diverse ideas 
from various origins that are fashioned into a pastiche 
(Rosenau 1992:12-14). This process of designing 
postmodern viewpoints explains why it is so extremely 
difficult to accurately characterize what postmodernism 
is. It also explains why it is so easy to select one or a few 
postmodern ideas and apply it to a certain topic and still 
have something "postmodern"- it is almost the way in 
which viruses duplicate themselves by continually 
changing their structure and genetic make-up! This 
analogy seems to fit postmodernism, a movement that is 
not "static and unchanging; rather it is endlessly dynamic, 
always in transition" (Rosenau 1992:17). 
 Although it is extremely difficult to classify 
postmodern ideas into a coherent conceptual scheme, it is 
possible to distinguish two broad strands within the 
postmodern debate. Rosenau refers to these strands as 
affirmative and skeptical postmodernism. Affirmative 
postmodernism is a general orientation which is generally 
hopeful and optimistic, and thus open to positive political 
action and the making of normative choices (Rosenau 
1992:15,16). This strand of postmodernism envisages a 
new post-modern social science with "goals and methods 
substantially different from those of modern social 
science" (Rosenau 1992:169). Their emphasis would not 
be on prediction and policy formation, but rather on a 
kind of description which would focus on "novelty and 
reflexivity as it looks to the richness of difference and and 
concentrates on the the unusual, the singular, and the 
original" (Rosenau 1992:169).  
 Skeptical postmodernism is the dark side of 
postmodernism, which offers a "negative, gloomy 
assessment" and argues that "the postmodern age is one 
of fragmentation, disintegration, malaise, 
meaninglessness, a vagueness or even absence of moral 
parameters and societal chaos" (Rosenau 1992:15). For 
this reason no social or political project could be worthy of 
commitment. This strand is very skeptical about a new 
postmodern social science and sees only a very limited 
role - criticism and deconstruction - for it. One of their 
reasons is that the universe is impossible to understand 
and the world is "fragmented, disrupted, disordered, 
interrupted and in search of instabilities" (Rosenau 
1992:170). Obviously there is not much to understand for 
any kind of social science in this sort of world! 
 Rosenau examines several important postmodern 
themes and their implications for the social sciences. Her 
conclusion, which she presents in a "modernist 
demeanor," is that she does not find a major role for 
postmodernism in the social sciences. Her main argument 
against such a role is that postmodernism is an 
intellectual current that emerged in the humanities, where 
it can be applied "without undue consequences" (Rosenau 
1992:167,168). However, she questions the application 
thereof in the social sciences, as it rests on the mistaken 
assumption that only minor differences exist between the 
humanities and the social sciences. This shows that she 
cannot go along with the postmodernists when they reject 
the application of the model of natural science inquiry in 
the social sciences. (They regard this application as part of 
the "larger techno-scientific corrupting cultural 
imperative" (Rosenau 1992:8)). 
 An example of a view that might work well in the 
humanities, but not in the social sciences, is that on the 
production of texts. Postmodern texts do not provide any 
answers in advance or any indisputable results. Rather, 
the postmodern reader is presented with more open, less 
  
definitive and exploratory texts that avoid judgement and 
closure, and that present disputable descriptions 
(Rosenau 1992:170). This leaves a major role for the 
postmodern readers as interpreters, who must give their 
own meaning to such texts, by toiling for answers in them. 
For Rosenau, however, authors in the social sciences 
reporting scientific results must be rigorous, analytical 
and ought to ground their results on reasons and good 
evidence (Rosenau 1992:168). This imperative stems from 
the socio-political role that social scientific findings play 
in policy-making and effecting power relations. For this 
reason authors in the social sciences cannot refuse to 
accept responsibility for their texts, as postmodernists 
would urge them to. By implication she says that only 
modern social science can be trusted to provide results 
that will avoid bad consequences, such as expert advice 
leading to bad decisions which may have "serious 
repercussions on human life conditions and the 
environment" (Rosenau 1992:168). 
 In this context she judges postmodern proposals for 
a methodological reconstruction of the social sciences as 
"seriously flawed and epistemologically dubious" 
(Rosenau 1992:168,169). She does, however, acknowledge 
one major contribution of postmodernism on substantive 
themes in that it focuses attention on the marginalized, 
that which is left out and those who are constructed as the 
other. Postmodern social scientists want to look at that 
which modern social science has never cared to 
understand in any detail such as, 
  "what has been taken for granted, what has been 
neglected, regions of resistance, the forgotten, 
the irrational, the insignificant, the repressed, 
the borderline, the classical, the sacred, the 
traditional, the eccentric, the sublimated, the 
subjugated, the rejected, the nonessential, the 
marginal, the peripheral, the excluded, the 
tenuous, the silenced, the accidental, the 
dispersed, the disqualified, the deferred, the 
disjointed" (Rosenau 1992:8). 
This tendency is confirmed by the major impact of 
postmodernism on social science in Europe, which is the 
"preference for anti-quantitative methodologies and in the 
emphasis on a small number of cases" (Mouton 1993:3). 
Social scientists prefer qualitative and participatory 
methodologies in which they can focus on ordinary 
persons and their understanding of the world. 
 Rosenau does not seem to be committed to a specific 
view on the outcome of the challenges that 
postmodernism presents to modern social science. She 
regards it as unlikely that any form of postmodern social 
science would gain undisputed acceptance in the near 
future (Rosenau 1992:174). It could happen that the 
postmodern challenge will split the social sciences into 
two groups, with the one influenced by the natural 
sciences and the other by the humanities (Rosenau 
1992:9). Another possiblity is that postmodernism will be 
selectively integrated into the mainstream social science 
(Rosenau 1992:181). This opens the risk that 
postmodernism will lose its identity and integrity, through 
adapting to, and compromising with, modern social 
science. Such a processs would involve "abandoning those 
postmodern assumptions that appear most absurd to 
conventional social science and harmonizing the 
remainder" (Rosenau 1992:181). No doubt that modern 
social science will be calling the shots if this last scenario 
works out! 
 Although Rosenau might be correct about the origin 
of most postmodern ideas in the humanities, this does not 
seem to be true about Lyotard's The Postmodern 
Condition, which reads like a philosophy of science text 
most of the time. This places it in a different category and 
indeed worthwhile to take it, or related work attempting 
to spell out its implications, seriously. The discussion of 
Joseph Rouse's philosophy of science later on presents 
such an opportunity. However, Rosenau's emphasis on 
the differences between the humanities and the social 
sciences, especially the reference to the influence of social 
scientists on policy making and power relations, is very 
valuable. So too are her attempts to show how valuable 
postmodern insights can be integrated into rigorous social 
scientific disciplines.  
 Another important contribution made by Rosenau is 
her discussion of the complex origins of postmodernism 
and how the endless variety of postmodern viewpoints 
comes about. These explanations create the impression 
that postmodernism as intellectual movement consists of 
a wide variety of ideas which are endlessly combined into 
new versions that can be applied to ever new areas. Thus, 
one is cautioned to create rigid definitions of 
postmodernism, but rather encouraged to be aware of the 
endless possibilities of using one or more postmodern 
ideas to bring about better understanding of some aspect 
of reality. 
Zuzana Parusnikova 
In an article with the title "Is a postmodern philosophy of 
science possible?" Zuzana Parusnikova (1992) answers a 
tentative no to this question, as she does not have much 
hope of applying postmodern ideas to the traditional 
discipline of philosophy of science. She characterizes 
postmodernism as consisting mainly of two tendencies. 
The first tendency derives from the Lyotardian idea that 
our world is fragmented into a plurality of worlds 
constituted by local autonomous discourses which cannot 
be unified by any grand narrative (Parusnikova 1992:23). 
This implies that even science itself cannot be viewed as 
having "one homogeneous discourse but rather (the 
concept is) an empty label for a diversity of research areas 
and activities" (Parusnikova 1992:23). Science thus 
displays its own diversity and plurality. Each of these 
smaller units plays their own games and displays rules 
that its practioners themselves have made. This 
postmodern idea on fragmented discourses would lead to 
philosophy of science becoming the exclusive domain of 
highly trained scientists concerned with conceptual issues 
in their own discipline. A plurality of "finite meta-
discourses" about science would arise where scientists 
reflect on their own discipline "without any great unifying 
ambitions" (Parusnikova 1992:35). 
 The second tendency of postmodernism that 
Parusnikova judges to be relevant to science is the 
poststructuralist idea of meaning as fundamentally 
elusive, slippery and ungraspable (1992:21; 31). This 
implies that some postmodernists think it fundamentally 
impossible to make meaning present. Science, on the 
other hand, relies on the idea that it is possible to put 
things clearly in language, to sort them out and include 
them in a hierarchy. However, this tendency in 
postmodernism tries to deconstruct texts, which means 
  
they want to show that every text betrays itself, has 
tensions between its "intended logics and various forms of 
unintended paradoxical activity which are suppressed in 
dogmatic, orthodox readings" (Parusnikova 1992:33). 
Taking this tendency seriously would lead to a literary 
criticism of scientific texts in which any authority of 
meaning would be destabilized (Parusnikova 1992:37). 
 In both cases of the two postmodern tendencies, 
philosophy of science is conceptualized as an 
"epistemological, foundationalist discipline" (Parusnikova 
1992:22) which will dissolve into other activities 
performed by academics better equipped than 
philosophers. This is in full accordance with the clearly 
stated postmodern conception of the role of philosophy, 
i.e. that philosophers can no longer provide any unique 
insights. Thus, philosophers of science have no unique 
insights relevant to science, unless they become specialists 
in science itself; at most they can conduct conversations 
with disturbing or edifying functions. This does not mean 
that they can provide any wisdom, but that they can only 
provoke, challenge or entertain (Parusnikova 1992:24). At 
times Parusnikova has an extremely negative view of 
postmodern philosophers. She interprets them to be 
saying that nothing should be taken too seriously, as it is 
not worth the trouble. Therefore she characterises 
postmodern philosophers as being like a contemporary 
Socrates who questions everything, but who - unlike 
Socrates - are not aiming to achieve the good or truth. 
Thus it becomes understandable why she "fail to 
understand how such philosophy could relate to a 
scientific discourse" (Parusnikova 1992:25). However, her 
interpretation and use of postmodern ideas are not the 
only ones possible. How a more selective and fruitful use 
of postmodern ideas is possible can be seen in the writings 
of Joseph Rouse. 
 Parusnikova's article is an attempt to determine the 
relevance of Lyotardian postmodernism and 
deconstruction for philosophy of science. She is at least 
partially correct in her judgement of the implications of 
postmodernism for a modern, foundationalist type of 
philosophy of science. Lyotardian postmodernism would 
indeed imply a severely diminished role for philosophy of 
science in that its role seemingly would have to be 
appropriated by philosophically inclined specialists within 
the various disciplines, or by various scientists, historians 
or literary critics studying different aspects of various 
sciences. Whether philosophy of science's loss of the role 
of cultural overseer in epistemological context, "who 
knows everyone's common ground" (Rorty 1980:317) is 
something worth mourning about is dubious. It would be 
if no other role could be defined for philosophy of science 
and the acceptance of postmodernism thus meant 
depriving philosophers of science of any meaningful role, 
in that no postmodern philosophy of science is possible at 
all. But is this really the case? I want to argue that a 
critical examination of Rouse's views will show both the 
viability of his proposals for a postmodern philosophy of 
science, as well as a meaningful, though differently 
defined role for philosophers of science. 
Joseph Rouse 
The discussion of Joseph Rouse starts with an exposition 
of his characterization of modern philosophy of science, 
and then moves on to his two proposals for a postmodern 
philosophy of science. Next I discuss his use of a typical 
postmodern idea, i.e. an explanation using narratives, for 
providing a fresh understanding of science, before I finally 
make an evaluation whether his proposals are viable. 
 Joseph Rouse's discussions of modernity and 
postmodernism with respect to the philosophy of science 
revolves around the Lyotardian idea of "global narratives 
of legitimation" (Rouse 1991b:610). In philosophy of 
science these metanarratives refer to the importance of 
the ability to tell a certain kind of story about the history 
of science which would justify the cultural authority of 
(natural) science in the Western world (Rouse 1991b:611). 
Such metanarratives touch on two issues. The one is the 
crucial role of the story of the spectacular growth of 
modern science and its wide-ranging influence through its 
technological applications in the narrative legitimation of 
modernity, as well as in the counter narratives which 
subvert the story of modern progress into one of 
unfolding disaster (Rouse 1991b:611). The other issue 
touched upon by the metanarratives of modern science is 
the attempt to justifiably view the history of science in 
terms of modernist ideas of progress or rational 
development (Rouse 1991b:611). 
 If Rouse (1991a:141) wants to classify most twentieth 
century philosophers of science - which he divides into 
three main traditions of logical empiricism, Kuhnian post-
empiricism (or postpositivism) and convergent realism - 
as being modernist and thus concerned with the narrative 
legitimation of science, then he has to define modernity 
not as a position, but as a "shared field of conflict" (Rouse 
191b:610). Such a shared field of conflict has both 
extensive areas of agreement, as well as several areas in 
which sharp differences are encountered. He identifies a 
few areas of such agreement among modern philosophers 
of science - including Carnap, Kuhn, Feyerabend and 
Boyd - belonging to the three traditions mentioned above. 
The first area of agreement is that they provide a "unified 
narrative structure within which to write the internal or 
philosophical history of science" (Rouse 1991a:141). They 
also agree that certain important concepts used in the 
interpretation of science, such as explanation or 
confirmation, are basically the same regardless of 
scientific discipline or the stage of its development. That 
there is a unitary and hierarchical relation - in whichever 
direction - between theory and observation/experiment is 
another common assumption. The final shared area of 
agreement is that all three traditions find a theory of 
meaning/reference regarded as an indispensable key for 
understanding science, its concepts and theory change in 
a philosophical way (Rouse 1991a:141). What Rouse is 
trying to say is that in their criticism of the conception of a 
dichotomy between theory and observation, 
postpositivists adopted a holistic theory of meaning 
through which both theoretical and observational terms 
are "treated as being implicitly defined by the theory in 
which they occur" (Newton-Smith 1981:12). This contrasts 
with the earlier positivist and neo-positivist approach 
which thought theoretical terms have their meaning 
determined holistically, whereas observational terms have 
their meaning specified in terms of verification and 
falsification conditions (Newton-Smith 1981:11).  
 Within these areas of agreement, diverse modern 
philosophers of science share a field of conflict. An 
example will illustrate the point. Whether positivists and 
realists can successfully give a global legitimation of 
modern science or whether they dismally fail in the view 
  
of radical postpositivists such as Paul Feyerabend, both 
parties to this conflict fully agree that the autonomy and 
cultural authority of the sciences require narrative 
legitimation. It is only in terms of this shared agreement 
that Feyerabend's rejection of the modernist project of 
legitimation could have its "proclaimed cultural and 
political consequence of challenging the preeminence of 
the sciences" (Rouse 1991b:608). 
 Is it possible to have a philosophy of science that 
reject the shared assumptions of the modern philosophy 
of science traditions? Rouse examines the so-called 
"piecemealist" critics - which include R Miller, L Laudan, 
D Shapere and P Galison - of these traditions to determine 
whether they succeed in creating a postmodernist 
philosophy of science in which there is no attempt at any 
global legitimation of modern science viewed as a unity (cf 
Rouse 1991b:609). According to Rouse's interpretation 
the piecemealists see their own fundamental break with 
the unified tradition in the philosophy of science as being 
a reorientation in different ways. They reject general 
explanations of science in favour of topic-specific or 
domain-determined explanations of science. They 
furthermore favour "multi-directional" relations among 
theories, methods, observation, instrumentation, 
experiment and values or goals (Rouse 1991a:155). That 
the nature of science can be better understood by 
examining necessities of language without taking into 
account the practice of science is also rejected. Finally, 
they assume to be able to provide a better understanding 
of the history of science as a "narrative of progress, of 
rational inquiry, and/or of the gradual approach toward 
truth" (Rouse 1991a:155).  
 For a balanced judgement on the piecemealist 
approach, which does not rely solely on Rouse's 
presentation of their views, I give a short overview of one 
such proposal, namely that of Peter Galison. Galison 
(1988:198) characterizes modernist tendencies in 
twentieth century philosophy of science in the sense of a 
search for a unifying scheme grounded first on 
observation (logical positivism) and then on theory 
(postempiricism). The unity of their accounts is enforced 
by a master narrative, i.e. by providing a priviledged 
vantage point (Galison 1988:207), which he characterizes 
as: "in the case of the positivists it is from the 
'observational foundation' building up, in the case of the 
antipositivists it is from the theoretical 'paradigm,' 
'conceptual scheme,' or 'hard core' looking down." Galison 
typifies his own alternative as a critical postmodern model 
(for physics only) which creates room for a diversity of 
physicists, such as theorists, experimentalists and 
instrument makers (Galison 1988:208), who can have 
strikingly different perspectives from one another on their 
discipline. He furthermore does not want to make the 
unwarranted assumption that there is a universally fixed, 
hierarchical relation between experiment and theory; 
rather he develops a view in which he accords partial 
autonomy to theory, experimentation and 
instrumentation. Continuity or discontinuity does not 
necessarily correspond between them; according to 
Galison "the breaks can occur at any level and the levels 
are intercalated so it is quite possible for continuity to 
persist at one level while being broken at another" 
(1988:208, 209). Thus, for Galison his own philosophy of 
science is postmodern for its focus on one discipline 
alone, the accommodation of diversity in it and the varied 
possible relationships between theory, experimentation 
and instrumentation (note that he has dropped the 
category of observation). 
 Despite the seemingly significantly different 
assumptions that the peacemealists share from those 
contained in the traditions stretching from positivism to 
realism, Rouse judges their philosophies of science to 
belong firmly to "the project of situating the sciences 
within the philosophical narratives of 'modernity'" (Rouse 
1991a:160). The main reason for his judgement is that 
they too interpret the history of science as a narrative of 
progress, rationality or the successful pursuit of truth, 
which serves to legitimate scientific practices and results 
(Rouse 1991a:160). The commitment of the piecemealists 
to provide a better narrative of scientific progress leads 
them to provide their own versions of an internal history 
of science (Rouse 1991a:157). Maintaining this idea 
requires that they distinguish between the content of 
science (its theories, methods, observations, reasoning) 
and the context within which scientists conceive, establish 
and communicate this content. The factors grouped under 
the content of science are the ones they regard as 
fundamental for understanding the development of 
science. Despite their avowed disinterest in a theory of 
meaning, this distinction demands an underlying theory 
of meaning which would justify "the identification of this 
common content across various modes of presentation, to 
different intended (and unintended) audiences, whose 
goals and assumptions may differ" (Rouse 1991a:158). 
 Even more damaging to their attempt to construct a 
postmodern philosophy of science, according to Rouse, is 
their emphasis on the diversity of scientific disciplines 
against the idea of a unified science. Acknowledging a 
diversity of autonomous domains of science which 
function according to their own rationality is judged by 
Rouse (1991a:157) not to be an appropriation of the 
postmodern emphasis on heterogeneity, but a promotion 
of the "disciplinary closure and autonomy which is the 
other side of modern rationalization." Thus Rouse prefers 
to once again interpret piecemealists as being modern, 
because he can purportedly show that their proposals 
concur with a fundamental part of the story of modernity, 
i.e. "the construction of autonomous domains of 
knowledge and practice, which can be rationally 
administered in accordance with internal goals and 
standards" (1991a:157). Whether his interpretation of the 
piecemealists is fair, will be critically examined in the 
evaluation of his views. 
Two proposals for a postmodern philosophy of 
science 
If the piecemealists are, according to Rouse, unable to 
break away successfully from the modern paradigm of 
philosophy of science, two questions arise. Is it possible 
for Rouse himself to break away from this paradigm, and 
if so, how does he do it? Rouse puts forward two 
affirmative proposals. One proposal he presents as an 
interesting but untried recipe - which he acknowledges 
would still take "much skillful adaptation to come out 
well, if it can do so at all" (Rouse 1991:161). Important 
ingredients of his recipe include doing without any 
attempts to narratively legitimate the history of science as 
a history of rationality, progress or the search for truth, as 
well as without the delegitimation and debunking of 
science by means of anti-modern narratives. This implies 
that scientific practices and disciplines will be partially 
  
legitimated within specific contexts and for particular 
purposes, and this localized legitimation - meaning 
legitimation conducted by scientists in and for their own 
specific disciplines - will not square well with the large-
scale legitimation attempted in grand narratives. Limited, 
local legitimation also means a revision of the concept of 
science, which emphasizes that various sciences differ 
interestingly from one another, and are complexly related 
- though these are not limited to their mutual 
relationships, but are also found among various 
components within a scientific discipline itself (cf Rouse 
1991a:161). A further ingredient of Rouse's recipe for a 
postmodern philosophy is the proposal to blur the 
distinction between the internal and external history of 
science, as well as to acknowledge that the concept of 
science has blurred edges in that it can refer to much 
more than just theories, observations and experiments 
and might also include museums, technology, science 
classes, advertisements, and so on. He furthermore 
proposes to think of knowers as "situated agents with an 
inescapably partial position" who are not studying a 
natural world out there, "entirely distinct" from the ways 
human beings interact with it (Rouse 1991a:161). 
 Rouse's second proposal for a postmodern 
philosophy of science consists of his critical examination, 
as well endorsement of Arthur Fine's views as an example 
of what would fit in with his proposal for a postmodern 
philosophy of science - despite the fact that Fine himself 
does not present his views as being explicitly postmodern. 
This proposal - the endorsement of the contents of Fine's 
philosophy - contains another example of a theme that is 
clearly related to Lyotard's postmodernism. It is an 
attempt by Fine to develop a philosophy of science 
without any grand narratives, in which the legitimations 
of scientific disciplines and practices - in the words of an 
ingredient of Rouse' recipe - are "always to be partial, and 
to take place in specific contexts, for particular purposes, 
to which large-scale (de-) legitimation has little relevance" 
(Rouse 1991a:161). This idea is very similar to Lyotard's 
alternative to consensus which he regards as an 
"outmoded and suspect value" (Lyotard 1984:66). He 
rejects terror, which he describes as the assumption that 
language games are isomorphic, as well as the attempt to 
make them so, instead of acknowledging that they are 
heteromorphous in nature. Once that is recognised, 
consensus is possible - resulting in a temporary contract - 
on the rules of a language game and legitimate moves 
therin, but he emphasizes that such consensus must be 
local, in the sense that the present players of a language 
game (scientific discipline) agree on it and that it is 
subject to cancellation at any later stage (Lyotard 
1984:66). This seems to be the underlying rationale that 
Rouse accepts for a postmodern philosophy of science, 
which will be illustrated below by Fine's philosophy of 
science and Rouse's endorsement thereof. 
 Rouse (1991b:609) chooses to discuss Arthur Fine's 
postmodern philosophy of science because Fine's 
opposition to any global legitimation project for science is 
"more centrally and explicitly" developed than anyone 
else's, without giving in to science-bashing or 
relinquishing the intellectual means necessary for a 
critical discussion of the cultural and political significance 
of the sciences. Fine clearly fits into the requirements that 
Rouse sets out for a postmodern philosophy of science 
when he interprets realist and instrumentalist 
philosophies of science as attempts to make sense of 
"science" (Fine 1986:171). This implies a common 
presupposition that modern science requires or permits a 
general interpretation of the scientific enterprise as a 
whole (Fine 1986:171). He rejects this approach to science 
and wants to explore "what happens philosophically when 
we approach science with trust and openly" (Fine 
1986:177). Approaching science in this way means giving 
up both rigid attachments to philosophical ideas about 
science, as well as any intention to attach science to "some 
ready-made philosophical engine" (Fine 1986:177). What 
one would be left with is Fine's natural ontological 
attitude (NOA), which is the common ground that would 
be left if the attempts by realism and instrumentalism to 
ascribe an overall aim to science, to make sense of science 
and to authenticate science are rejected. This common 
ground would include a description of scientific practice 
"in terms of structures of evidence and inferences 
sometime generating beliefs about what is true, and 
sometimes generating reasonable pragmatic 
commitments that fall short of belief" (Fine 1986:170). 
 What does the natural ontological attitude imply for 
a philosophy of science? It implies that philosophers 
should resist questions about the overall aim or meaning 
of science (Fine 1986:172,173). This does not imply that 
science has no meaning or aim, but rather that such 
questions must be asked locally, i.e. whether a specific 
investigation, scientific researcher or team of researchers 
have aims and what meanings individual projects have. 
Fine urges philosophers of science to resist the logical 
fallacy that would lead them from the statement "They all 
have aims" to "There is an aim they all have" (Fine 
1986:173). There is no need to worry about a general aim 
for science as it is possible to cope perfectly well with 
much less than that. Fine compares science with life in 
that it shows "its multiple and mini-aims daily" (Fine 
1986:174). Finding general aims or goals for science 
would in no way improve our understanding of science. A 
closely related implication is that Fine regards science as 
an historical entity which grows and changes as a result of 
various internal and external pressures. This means that a 
variety of questions can be asked about any of its aspects 
at any specific time and therefore it can be studied from 
different angles by various disciplines (Fine 1986:173). 
Fine thus rejects the idea that science has an essence 
other than its contingent, historical existence which 
changes continually (Fine 1986:174).  
 Fine characterizes his own philosophy of science as a 
"minimalist stance" which shows "just how minimal an 
adequate philosophy of science can be" (Fine 1984:101). 
He recommends a trusting attitude toward the overall 
good sense of science, as well as our own, in which 
scientific truths as well as everyday truths are accepted. 
This acceptance follows on an inspection of a matter in 
which it has been decided what is most reasonable to 
believe in. However, explaining the everyday use of the 
concept of truth in a theory or analysis of truth is 
unacceptable to Fine (1984:101), as no additions would be 
either legitimate or required. His "no-theory conception 
of truth" sees the concept of truth as an unanalysed term 
with a basic and well-understood use and he accepts its 
usual logic and grammar (Fine 1986:175). This means 
accepting its variety of uses, but refraining from 
explaining them as grounded in the nature of truth, or 
attempting to show what makes truths true (Fine 
  
1986:175). What Fine wants to argue is that philosophical 
conceptions of truth are global and essensialist, whereas a 
conception of truth functions in a pragmatic way in a local 
scientific context where scientists themselves negotiate 
their meaning for use in their specific context (Rouse 
1991b:611). Thus, such conceptual questions are local 
issues to specific scientists who can answer them 
adequately "with the exercise of imagination and 
judgement" (Rouse 1991b:612). If philosophers of science 
want to play any meaningful role they would have to 
engage the use of such concepts by a specific group of 
scientists, and also respect "the contextualised concerns 
which circumscribe that use" (Rouse 1991b:612). Such a 
sensitivity to context, as well as to the historically 
contingent nature of science and the particular concerns 
of groups of scientists engaged in scientific practices and 
disciplines are the factors which convince Joseph Rouse 
(1991b:625) to endorse Arthur Fine's natural ontological 
attitude as a step in the right direction toward a 
postmodern philosophy of science. 
The use of narratives to explain the workings of 
science 
Joseph Rouse attempts a narrative reconstruction of 
science by taking up another Lyotardian idea, viz. the 
importance of narratives in everyday life. For Rouse this 
means that it is fundamental for our understanding of 
science to look at the work of scientists as a process, 
rather than view their work as a product, i.e. theories, 
results of experiments, or data. Rouse's narrative 
reconstruction of science shows how a narrative 
understanding of science can be illuminating. Thereby it 
is also explicitly postmodern in nature. He challenges the 
modern demand for a global legitimation of science by 
demonstrating that scientists do not need philosophical 
explications of the epistemic and ontological standing of 
scientific research. The reason is that a narrative 
understanding of science reveals that scientists have a 
"developing sense of what counts as an adequate 
explanation, of when a claim is well confirmed, of whether 
a postulated entity can be taken as actually existing, and 
so forth" (Rouse 1990:193). Rouse furthermore denies 
that scientists would take criticisms of their use of 
concepts seriously if it is based on general philosophical 
views; only criticism directed at the scientific concerns of 
a specific discipline and couched in the terms used in that 
particular discipline / practice at a specific time will be 
taken seriously (Rouse 1990:194). 
 Joseph Rouse's postmodern reconstruction of the 
activity of scientists in terms of a narrative understanding 
consists of explanations of science as a series of activities 
situated in a narrative field, of what makes scientific 
claims, procedures or experiments significant and of the 
role of scientific literature within the narrative field of 
science. Characteristic of his narrative reconstruction of 
science is his assumption that narratives are not only 
important to a specific group of academic disciplines, but 
to all of them (Rouse 1990:181). He does not show that 
scientific results are presented in the form of a narrative; 
his concerns with narratives and science lie elsewhere. He 
rejects from the start the possibility of imposing a 
narrative scheme on science, because he wants to 
demonstrate that "we live within various ongoing stories" 
- even in science (Rouse 1990:181). His emphasis is 
indeed on ongoing stories, which means that he 
understands scientific knowledge as belonging to 
narratives that are continually constructed and 
reconstructed by several authors all struggling to play a 
major part in the unfolding of the story's plot. 
 How does a narrative reconstruction of science 
illuminate the activities of scientists? One way is to see 
scientists as sharing a narrative field, which means that 
several narratives are competing for dominance within a 
contested field (Rouse 1990:185). This means that 
meaningful differences as well as convergence of opinions 
are simultaneously possible within that field. The 
differences result from the work of various scientists who 
aim "to push the story line in different directions" (Rouse 
1990:182). These different directions constantly threaten 
the narrative coherence within a specific scientific 
discipline which, in the form of a shared understanding of 
the current research situation, is needed for keeping 
differences intelligible and for creative scientific work to 
be done (Rouse 1990:182). New scientific knowledge, 
Rouse (1990:183) argues, results from this "ongoing 
tension between narrative coherence and its threatened 
unraveling". 
 This idea of scientists sharing a contested field of 
competing narratives becomes more intelligible once one 
asks how scientists decide on the significance of claims, 
procedures, experiments or theories. According to Rouse 
(1990:186) it is impossible to understand science unless 
one knows how scientists resolve this issue of the 
significance of any scientific contribution, as it crops up at 
all levels of decision-making in the scientific community. 
A narrative understanding of science illuminates this 
issue too. Scientists have a reasonably coherent narrative 
about the development of their field and place their own 
work within this narrative as "an intelligible response to 
the history of successes and failures" which have led to the 
present situation (Rouse 1990:186). If a scientific result 
becomes significant, it results from the extent to which 
such a result "advances or transforms the narrative of how 
a field of research has recently developed" (Rouse 
1990:186). If it does advance or transform the narrative, it 
means that such a result becomes significant for use in 
further scientific investigations in that field or related 
ones. It also implies that significant scientific results 
which advance or transform the narrative, thus change 
the shared understanding of scientists in that field and 
alters ideas about what is to be regarded as significant 
contributions to that field (Rouse 1990:187). Because of 
this possibility of exerting influence on the unfolding of 
their narrative field, scientific research is highly 
competitive. Scientist vie with one another to influence 
the direction of research in their field and to create an 
important place for their results in the unfolding 
narratives of their field (Rouse 1990:190). 
 In the light of this attempt to explain scientific 
activity as embedded in a narrative field, Rouse explains 
the workings of scientific literature. He does not portray 
scientific papers as being narratives themselves, but 
rather as something that can only be understood in the 
context of a story (Rouse 1990:188) - the narrative field of 
a specific discipline. Although this narrative context is 
only barely, if at all, sketched within a paper, scientific 
authors presuppose that "their peers and readers already 
understand that situation" (Rouse 1990:191). They 
nevertheless situate the results of their scientific activity 
within a context containing narrative fragments of the 
recent development of the field, which would be adequate 
  
for other scientists to judge whether they add to or 
transform the narrative(s) of their discipline (cf Rouse 
1990:188,190). Thus readers of scientific papers are 
mostly other scientists who read with the purpose of 
finding out "what results they must take account of, what 
techniques they may usefully employ, and what research 
opportunities they could profitably take up" (Rouse 
1990:188). Textbooks and review articles are also 
reconstructions of the narrative(s) of a discipline which 
relate significant results which have modified or 
transformed the narrative(s) (cf Rouse 1990:189). 
Evaluation of Joseph Rouse 
Thus far it has been illustrated how Joseph Rouse 
sketches the outlines of a postmodern philosophy of 
science which is strongly related to some Lyotardian 
postmodern themes. What is the worth of his proposal for 
a postmodern philosophy of science? Rouse succeeds in 
presenting a coherent postmodern philosophy of science 
based on Lyotardian themes. I will evaluate his view by 
looking critically at his use of narratives, the endorsement 
of Arthur Fine's philosophy of science, the distinction 
made between modern and postmodern and the role he 
assigns to philosophers of science. 
 Rouse's use of the idea of narratives for providing a 
deeper understanding of science is clearly a success. It 
provides us with insight in the way in which scientists 
judge the significance of any new scientific work and 
subsequently re-evaluate previous work. It also deepens 
our understanding of the fierce competition among 
scientists for getting their results accepted. Endorsing 
Arthur Fine's philosophy of science as conforming to his 
own proposals for a postmodern philosophy of science - 
though Fine himself does not describe his philosophy in 
those terms - enables Rouse to illustrate his point about 
the viability of a postmodern philosophy of science 
effectively. Fine resists all attempts at providing overall 
views or general theories - thus nothing in the style of a 
grand narrative is given. He describes science as having 
no overall aim, no essence and no general theory of truth. 
Furthermore scientists are urged to answer their own 
conceptual questions and philosophers - in support of 
Rorty's view on the diminished role of philosophy - are 
cautioned to resist interpreting science through their own 
philosophical theories.  
 His characterization of a modern philosophy of 
science with its tendency towards a unitary explanation of 
science seems to be accurate. However, whether he can so 
easily classify the bulk of twentieth century philosophers 
of science as being all similarly modern is questionable. 
One could easily argue that Thomas Kuhn provides a non-
essensialist definition of science, as the nature and rules 
of science changes along with every paradigm shift. The 
same could be said about the piecemealist, Peter Galison. 
His philosophy of science is specifically devised for 
physics, and he allows for a variety of relationships 
between theory, experimentation and observation. He 
furthermore - in typically postmodern fashion - allows for, 
and accommodates diversity in physics. He wants to 
create a historiography of science that has room for "a 
multiplicity of cultures within the much larger rubric of 
scientific practice: A culture of theory, surely, but also a 
culture of experimentation, and a culture of instrument 
building" (Galison (1988:211). Although Galison 
appropriates other themes from the complex debates 
about postmodernism than the Lyotardian ones that 
Rouse emphasizes, Rouse should at least acknowledge the 
explicit postmodern nature of Galison's work.  
 The interpretation that Rouse gives of Galison and 
the other piecemealists raises an important question. It 
concerns the assumption behind his discussion of them. 
Rouse assumes that if he can point to any form of 
continuity between the piecemealists and the modern 
tradition they try to overcome, then they fail either to 
overcome a modern philosophy of science, or to establish 
a postmodern one (cf. 1991a:155). This assumption shows 
Rouse's own views on postmodernism, which are mainly 
determined by Lyotardian themes. Rouse is too rigid in 
his definition of postmodernism along Lyotardian lines. 
At this stage of the debates on postmodernism there are 
several other versions of postmodernism besides those of 
Lyotard. Furthermore, amidst so much controversy about 
the characteristics of postmodernism, Rouse would do 
better to recognize various kinds of both modern and 
postmodern characteristics and thus place different 
philosophies of science on a continuum somewhere 
between being fully modern or postmodern. The overview 
of different philosophies of science in this article supports 
this view. Rouse, for example, nowhere uses 
deconstruction and Murphy's (perhaps controversial) 
classification of Kuhn, Wittgenstein and Austin as 
postmodern thinkers shows the extent to which issues 
about postmodernism are still debated, and not yet 
settled. Whether postmodernism is really something that 
tries to overcome modernity (modernism), is also still 
controversial. One possible definition of postmodernism - 
well supported in the literature - goes as follows: 
Postmodernism stimulates a deeper insight in, and better 
understanding of modernity. A definition of 
postmodernism can be given in Hegelian terms: 
postmodernism is the spirit of the Enlightenment 
(modernity) coming to self-consciousness, or as Giddens 
(1990:48) puts it: "modernity coming to understand 
itself." Postmodernism can be considered to be in no way 
trans- or anti-modern; as Wolfgang Welsch says: "Sie ist 
eigentlich radikal-modern, nicht post-modern." Thus one 
can interpret postmodernism as reflection on the nature, 
potential, shortcomings and darker sides of modernity. 
That such a definition is plausible supports the view that 
Rouse should rather place different philosophies of 
science on a continuum somewhere between being fully 
modern or postmodern: placement would depend on the 
depth of influence that the appropriation of various 
modern or postmodern characteristics, has on a specific 
philosophy of science. 
 What role does Rouse's postmodern philosophy of 
science offer its practitioners? In the postmodern 
philosophy of science proposed by Rouse, scientists would 
take responsibility for the philosophical issues cropping 
up in the shared discourse of their own specific scientific 
disciplines. This would either imply that scientists 
undergo philosophical training as well, or that scientists 
have skilled philosophers of science - conversant with 
both disciplines - that are capable of engaging in 
interdisciplinary dialogue with them. It could not imply 
that all scientists become philosophically minded, as it 
just simply is the case that most scientists are not 
philosophically inclined most of the time. This is borne 
out by the experience Bryan Magee had (and the author as 
well) with attempts to bring scientists and philosophers 
together for discussion. These attempts failed for lack of 
  
interest among scientists. Although many philosophers 
might have the same experience with scientists, it is also 
true that "many of the path-breakers who actually made 
the scientific revolution of this century have written books 
of philosophical reflection about it" (Magee 1978:203, 
204). Thomas Kuhn gives a better explanation of the 
central role of such reflection for some scientists. They 
make extensive use of thought experiments, which can 
have the same outcome as scientific revolutions, viz. a 
radical conceptual change of a specific science. This 
philosophical aspect of scientific transformation is clearly 
expressed in Kuhn's reference to these scientists as the 
great "weavers of new conceptual fabrics" (1981:26). 
 The idea of Rouse that philosophy of science should 
be informed by a thorough knowledge of the workings of a 
science makes sense, as philosophical theories about 
science can only be meaningful and relevant if they are 
informed by the specific issues, contents and workings of 
that discipline with which scientists are (often only 
tacitly) familiar. Although Rouse would limit philosophers 
of science to this role, there is another function which they 
can fulfil. In a sense this function betrays the views of 
both Rouse and Fine on the limited role of philosophy, 
because it is ironically exemplified as an unacknowledged 
function in their own work. It has to do with the 
traditional broader perspective of philosophy which tends 
to utilize a critical distance in developing its views. This 
typical philosophical stance provides unique insight in, 
and understanding, of science. One can see it when 
Lyotard, Fine and Rouse apply the Wittgensteinian notion 
of language games to the various scientific disciplines and 
when Fine and Rouse give a strong non-essentialist 
definition of science. It also enables Lyotard to note the 
significance of narratives in human life and thus Rouse 
can use that to give a narrative reconstruction of science 
whereby he thoroughly illuminates the workings of 
science and the everyday activities of scientists. One is 
left, though, with a nagging feeling that Rouse might here 
have slipped back into a modernist approach which he so 
consistently detects in others, viz. the idea that science is 
something capable of unitary (narrative) explanation. 
How do postmodern ideas contribute to our 
understanding of science? 
What are the most important contributions that 
postmodern ideas can make to our understanding of 
science? The preceding overview of the literature suggests 
that postmodernism provides a bewildering diversity of 
ideas that can be used in an endless variety of ways to 
illuminate different aspects of science. Some examples are 
the following: 
* postmodernism makes us conscious of the 
metanarratives that are used to justify the cultural 
authority of (natural) science in the Western world. Such 
metanarratives use as justification either the spectacular 
growth of modern science, or its supposed embodiment of 
progress or rational development. 
* instead of the overall legitimation of science by 
means of metanarratives, postmodernism suggests that 
scientists themselves give a localised, partial legitimation 
of their own scientific practices and disciplines within 
specific contexts and for particular purposes. 
* postmodernism rejects any unified explanations of 
the essential nature of science. Science is viewed as 
consisting of a set of fragmented, local autonomous 
discourses of which no one definition applicable to all 
sciences can be given. Similarly, science has no overall 
meaning or aim, although specific projects or parts of a 
discpline might have their own aims. Scientists 
themselves must reach a local consensus on the definition 
of their discipline or on the aim(s) of their project(s).  
* postmodernists would encourage scientists to be 
aware not only of the diversity of science, but also of the 
diversity of conceptions and practices of science within 
their own disciplines. Not only is there a diversity of 
different "cultures" (such as theory, experimentation, 
instrument building, cf. Galison) in physics, for example, 
but also a diversity of possible relationships between 
theory and observation. It is no longer possible to assert 
simplistically that observation determines theory, or vice 
versa. 
* postmodernism presents us with a narrative 
interpretation of science, which helps us to understand 
the workings of science as process much better. It shows 
that scientific knowledge belongs to narratives that are 
continually constructed and reconstructed by several 
authors all struggling to play a major part in the unfolding 
of the story's plot. Scientists share a narrative field, in 
which their narratives are competing for dominance. This 
means that meaningful differences as well as convergence 
of opinions are simultaneously possible within that field. 
If a scientific result becomes significant, it results from 
the extent to which such a result advances or transforms 
the narrative of how a field of research has recently 
developed. This means that such a result becomes 
significant for use in further scientific investigations in 
that field or related ones. It also changes the shared 
understanding of scientists in that field and alters ideas 
about what is to be regarded as significant contributions 
to that field. 
* postmodernism presents scientists with an ethical 
imperative as well. It urges scientists to become aware of 
all kinds of things, persons, events and issues that were 
previously ignored, for whatever reasons. In this sense it 
purports to become the voice of those who are voiceless in 
our contemporary culture. Such a widening of perspective 
and a deepening of outlook can unearth valuable new 
insights about the construction of our natural and human 
world. 
* postmodernism would, on the one hand, imply a 
severely diminished role for philosophy of science. Many 
aspects of its role would have to be appropriated by 
philosophically inclined specialists within the various 
disciplines, or by various scientists, historians or literary 
critics studying different aspects of various sciences. 
Scientists themselves would take responsibility for the 
philosophical issues cropping up in the shared discourse 
of their own specific scientific disciplines. This would 
either imply that scientists undergo philosophical training 
as well, or that scientists have skilled philosophers of 
science - conversant with both disciplines - that are 
capable of engaging in interdisciplinary dialogue with 
them. 
 However, on the other hand, there is another, more 
traditional function which philosophers of science can 
fulfil. It is ironically exemplified as an unacknowledged 
function in the work of these postmodern philosophers, 
although most of them explicitly deny this function to 
philosophy of science. It has to do with the traditional 
broader perspective of philosophy which tends to utilize a 
  
critical distance in developing its views. This typical 
philosophical stance provides unique insight in, and 
understanding, of science, such as a narrative or 
postmodern understanding. 
Conclusion 
At this stage of the debates on postmodernism, there is 
still a lot of controversy about the exact definitions of 
modernity and postmodernism. What is clear, however, is 
that postmodernism presents us with a wide variety of 
ideas that can be used in different combinations to 
enlighten aspects of our reality. Thus, different sets of 
ideas can be classified as being postmodern, and it is not 
at all clear that all these ideas can be helpful in a specific 
quest for a better understanding of our world. Sometimes 
they are helpful and sometimes not. In typical 
postmodern fashion one will have to cut and paste 
amongst postmodern ideas; appropriate, transform or 
transcend diverse ideas; construct them into a pastiche 
and apply it locally to determine its worth. 
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